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Abstract 
In a strange and awkward way the transition to democracy in South Africa have 
occurred simultaneously as the HIV/AIDS epidemic firmly and steadily have 
strengthen its grip around the country. HIV/AIDS have become security a process 
referred to as securitization. With security theory provided by the Copenhagen 
School a theoretical framework is constructed discussing the possibilities and pros 
and cons of health securitization. By studying the events in the most recent South 
African history dating from 1994 – 2004 the author wants to show the dynamics 
of the securitization process of HIV/AIDS. The study shows that HIV/AIDS has a 
very complex relation to the South African society. Remnants of apartheid, 
traditional beliefs, tensions between the developed and developing world on who 
has the right answers, and political scandals and inaction have all formed the 
South African HIV/AIDS discourse. The result of this discourse is shown in how 
HIV/AIDS and those infected by HIV and those with AIDS are treated by the rest 
of the society.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War the field for scholars and students in peace and 
conflict studies have widened dramatically. New areas previously not considered 
having anything to do with peace and security have risen on the agendas of both 
scholars and politicians. No longer are men in green clothes charging against you 
the only real threat against states in our world. Today and for the last decade more 
people have died of complications related to them having full developed AIDS 
than in wars and conflict-zones. The threats have changed character and the armed 
men in green clothes are replaced with microscopic viruses that have taken 
advantage of one of our most primitive and important needs to infect, spread, and 
kill. The HIV/AIDS pandemic have been a fact since the beginning of 1990’s. It is 
however not until recent years that the issue has been given serious attention as 
the terrible effects of the disease are becoming visible at an increasingly high 
pace.  
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
 
I have chosen to study the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa and applying a 
securitization theory to see how HIV/AIDS became securitized in South Africa. 
Most research written about security and HIV/AIDS have a normative approach 
questioning whether it is a good idea or not to securitize diseases like HIV/AIDS. 
Research looking into the events of and dynamics of the securitization process 
when HIV/AIDS becomes securitized is scarce if not totally absent. With this 
thesis I will take the first steps into this un-chartered territory.  
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. With no previously written literature 
available to guide me my first task is to expand the theoretical framework of 
securitization so it becomes applicable to the health sector. Secondly I have to 
apply this newfound knowledge to my case South Africa. With this done I will be 
able to spot the dynamics of the securitization process. The question guiding my 
research is: 
 
 
• How can the securitization process of HIV/AIDS in South Africa be 
understood?    
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1.2 Method 
 
I have chosen to study a single case over the time period of 1994-2004. There are 
a couple of reasons for my choice of a single case study. More than one case 
would imply a comparison. If doing that I would first of all have to come up with 
a set of criteria for selection the cases and do this thoroughly to avoid what is 
known as selection bias (Svensson & Teorell 2006 p 222). Secondly I would have 
to draw generalizing conclusions from my findings otherwise there would be no 
point in comparing cases given that there are variations between them. I would 
also have to find a isolate variables for which I can find in all cases (Svensson & 
Teorell 2006 p 243). As the available literature, as previously mentioned, is very 
scarce it would be very hard to find cases and variable suitable for such a study. In 
other words I have nu intention of making generalizing findings of how 
securitization is done as it varies from case to case. The securitization process (see 
2.2.2) is intersubjective and each case has it specific circumstances surrounding 
the process. 
South Africa became a democracy in 1994 and with that started a new chapter 
in the countries history. With democracy came a new kind of politics and 
policymaking as well as new institutions and departments of the government. 
1994 was also the year in which the HIV epidemic fully erupted in South Africa 
and became an issue on the political agenda. Studying the events for a decade is a 
convenient amount of time and also provides a couple of years of distance to the 
last years of my study. This time period also appropriately covers the events 
occurring in the UN Security Council in early 2000. The first time HIV/AIDS and 
international security was discussed in the council.  
The theory of my choice is the Copenhagen School. It provides the most 
inclusive framework on securitization and is seen as the most influential, original 
and important contribution to security studies over the last decade (Elbe 2006 p 
124). The Copenhagen School provides theoretical framework for securitization in 
5 sectors – political, military, societal, economic, and environmental (Buzan & de 
Wilde & Wæver 1998). There is however nothing that says their ideas of 
securitization also can be applied to other sectors, such as health. To the best of 
my ability I will put together an agenda for health security similar to those 
agendas provided by the Copenhagen School for each sector they addressed. 
1.3 Material 
All articles, documents, and books used in this thesis used for empirical material 
are from 2004 – 2006. This is almost true for all material used in the thesis where 
it not for the material used for the theoretical framework. The material obtained 
through Buzan et al. (1998) constitutes the foundation on which the theoretical 
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framework is built upon. For the agenda for health security much material comes 
from Price-Smith (2002) one of the few who have written about and conducted 
research on health and security. To complement Price-Smith in the health agenda 
I have also used articles mostly deals with HIV/AIDS. The agenda for health 
security is therefore, I admit, slightly biased towards HIV/AIDS. I have 
deliberately chosen not to use hardly any statistical material about HIV/AIDS. 
This is because I have noticed that statistics vary depending on the source. I have 
also learned that comparing HIV/AIDS statistics are almost useless as states use 
different ways of estimating the numbers. The only statistics I have used is taken 
from the UNAIDS Epidemic Report for December 2006 and is only used to 
illustrate the situation in South Africa for the reader. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
A large and important part of this thesis is the second chapter. It provides the 
thesis with the theoretical framework needed while at the same time explaining 
the securitization process. The chapter ends with my theory contributing part – the 
agenda for health security. My case, South Africa, follows and begins with a short 
history of HIV/AIDS in the country to help the reader understand the actual 
situation in South Africa. Then comes an overview of the political events in South 
Africa between 1994 – 2004 that has to do with HIV/AIDS policymaking. The 
“relationship” between South Africans  and HIV/AIDS is then addressed and the 
third chapter ends with a look at the regional intergovernmental organization 
SADC’s view on AIDS. Finally chapter four is dedicated to discussion and 
conclusion.  
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2 Securitization Theory 
2.1 Widening the Security Agenda  
During the days of the cold war the meaning of the word security in the political 
and academic debate was clear to everyone. It refereed to measures on how to 
avoid the possibility of a direct military confrontation between the two super 
powers and the consequence of which would most likely make the world 
uninhabitable. Security was only prevalent in the context of national security. In 
these days when the realists had monopoly on perceptions about international 
relations, security was a matter for the military. Military strength was seen as the 
solution to the security problem (Sheehan 2005 p 2, 6). The analysts working with 
security, or strategic studies of which security was a subfield, were in fact often 
from the military profession and saw, obviously, security through military eyes. 
This meant that they, e.g., impossibly could have seen the dangerous potential of 
the emerging identities in Yugoslavia during the 1980’s (Sheehan 2005 s 57).  
This view of what constituted security attracted critique from scholars. 
Scholars pointed out that security was a product that had ascended from the 
cultural context of the industrialized countries in the west with a Westphalian 
heritage. The aim of security during the Cold War era was to preserve peace and 
status quo. For the poor people of Africa status quo was the least of all things they 
wanted to preserve. They wanted justice and a chance for development. The 
interests of peace for first world collided with the demands of justice for the third 
world (Sheehan 2005 p 7). In 1970’s in the economic and the environmental 
sectors voices were raised against this view and in the 1980’s things slowly 
started to change (Buzan et al. 1998 p 2).  Barry Buzan’s book People, States and 
Fear was published in 1983 and so was also Richard Ullman’s article Redefining 
Security. These two suggested that the security concept needed to be opened up or 
widened. Buzan takes the largest leap of the two and argues for a widening or 
deepening of the security concept into two directions. First, besides the military 
sector he wanted to put security in the political, societal, environmental, and 
economical sectors. And secondly he wanted to change the referent object, the 
thing needed to be secured, to not only be the state but also to be the international 
system above the state and the individual below it (Sheehan 2005 p 43f). 
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2.2 The Copenhagen School  
 “As a consequence, two views of security are now on the table, the new one of 
the wideners and the old military and state-centered view of the traditionalists.” 
(Buzan et al. 1998 p 1).  
 
It is necessary to define the levels the Copenhagen School uses in its analyses. 
The levels are used to show the locations of causes and effects. The largest is the 
international system (there could theoretically be more than one system at this 
level, which is an historical fact). The second largest level is international 
subsystems. These are distinguishable from the rest of the international system in 
some way or another. They can be geographically coherent and form a region (e.g. 
EU) but if not they are just a subsystem (e.g. OPEC). The next level is comprised 
of units. These are actors that can take a number of different forms from states, 
nations to transnational companies to name but a few. These are in turn made up 
of subunits that are organized groups of individuals with the potential of affecting 
the behavior of a unit (e.g. lobbies). And finally the fifth and last level of analysis 
is the individual (Buzan et al. 1998 p 5f). Securitization and the speech act (see 
below) are processes which involves collectives and their intersubjective 
decisions. It is therefore very seldom that the individual level is used in the 
analysis.   
2.2.1 Securitization  
Every public issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized to 
politicized to securitized. A nonpoliticized issue is in no way dealt with by the 
state and it is not part of the public debate, e.g. religion in the US. Compare this 
with Iran or Saudi Arabia where religion is politicized and thus requires 
government decisions, resources or even governance. A securitized issue 
represents something that is an existential threat to the referent object and justifies 
measures and actions outside of the normal political (and in some cases 
democratic) procedures. Culture and more specifically western culture is an 
example of an issue that was seen as an existential threat to the Soviet Union and 
therefore securitized. This was and still is obviously not the case in, for example, 
the UK. Where an issue ends up on the spectrum depends not only on the issue 
itself but also on geographical location and surrounding circumstances (Buzan et 
al. 1998 p 23f). The most important thing is that securitizing an issue means to 
place it above the normal proceedings of politics. Thus requiring extraordinary 
measures that would normally not be accepted or for that matter being legitimate. 
What truly defines the core of security in international relations is “the survival of 
collective units and principles [and] the politics of existential threat” (Buzan et al. 
1998 p 27). Securitization has its pros and cons. What has to weighed are the 
consequences of “applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages 
of focus, attention, and mobilization.” (Buzan et al. 1998 p 29)  
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2.2.2 Speech Act 
The process of securitization is often compared by Buzan et al. (1998) to the 
speech act of theoretical linguistics. A speech act is not referring to an actual 
event. Instead it is the speech act itself that is the event. This can be compared to 
giving a promise to someone. Unless you say it there is no promise. It is the act of 
giving the promise that is the actual event or act. For something to be security, 
uttering the issue and the word security in the same sentence will simply not do 
(Buzan et al. 1998 s 26f).  It is only when an issue is presented with the logic and 
grammar of the speech act that we can talk about securitization. For this we need 
four components “(i) securitizing actors (such as political leaders, intelligence 
experts, etc.), declaring (ii) a referent object (such as a state) to be (iii) 
existentially threatened (e.g., by an imminent invasion), and who make a 
persuasive call for the adoption of (iv) emergency measures to counter this threat 
(e.g., declare war or impose a curfew)” (Elbe 2006 p 125f). 
Buzan et al. claim that security is always about the future and therefore 
hypothetical and about counterfactuals. What will happen if we take action and 
what will happen if we do not?     
Security is an arena were objective standards are practically impossible to 
apply. Even if tanks were to rush over your border you cannot be sure if it is a 
threat or not unless you know the socially constituted relationship between the 
tank and the referent object. Example, the tanks can be hostile but also part of 
peace-keeping force. For a securitization to take place the emergency measures 
adopted to counter the existential threat must be accepted by the referent object. If 
it (read they) do not accept and tolerate these emergency measures that under 
normal circumstances would be illegitimate there is no securitization. The final 
component that is needed for a successful securitization is an acceptance from the 
people. Securitization is therefore essentially an intersubjective process “as with 
all politics” (Buzan et al. 1998 p 30f). The rhetoric of securitization would 
therefore sound something like “if we don’t take action against this threat now 
everything else will become unimportant”. Obviously meaning that there will not 
be anything left as this threat threatens our very existence. It is important to 
underline that this in itself is only a securitizing move not a securitization. A 
securitization does not require that extreme measures are actually taken but that 
the argumentation for a securitization has created a platform from which it would 
be possible to legitimize emergency measures that earlier would not have been 
possible (Buzan et al. 1998 p 25). According to all of this there is no such thing as 
objective security. However certain events can aid the securitization process as 
facilitating conditions. Securitization is more likely to succeed on the state and 
nation level. This because it is on these levels we find the strongest collective 
identities. If a securitizing actor can convince the referent object that their 
identity, what makes them who they are, is threatened a securitization process is 
likely to succeed. This is why we rarely see successful securitization on the global 
level as it is very difficult to unite all of mankind to perceive a threat in the same 
way (Buzan et al. 1998 p 23).     
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2.2.3 Regionalizing, Classical Security Complex Theory and Beyond 
The Copenhagen School makes the assumption that in the post-Cold War-bipolar 
world regionalization will gain ground at the expense of globalization. Regional 
security concerns will no longer be held down due to geostrategic concerns of 
Super Powers. Regions will therefore be allowed to follow their own agenda and 
more independently sort out their own problems and possibilities. The 
Copenhagen School has therefore adapted the Security Complex Theory to 
explain how security and securitization are interconnected (Buzan et al. 1998 p 9, 
43). Buzan’s Security Complex Theory elaborated on the assumption that 
international security is a relational matter, i.e., how different collectives of 
humans experience and relate to each other. The focus is set on regions or security 
complexes that fill the gap between “national security” and “global security”. 
According to Buzan states fear their neighbors more than distant powers due to 
the fact that threats travel more easily over short distances than long (Buzan et al. 
1998 p 10f). Buzan defines these security complexes as “a set of states whose 
major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another” (Buzan et al. 1998 p 12). The main characteristics of a security complex 
is that they consist of at least two states, the states form a geographically coherent 
group, the states’ relationship are marked by security interdependence (that can be 
both positive or negative), and that security complex is profound and durable, 
although not necessarily permanent. Buzan limited this early work to the military 
and political sectors in his security complexes (Buzan et al. 1998 p 19).  
The Copenhagen School has moved beyond this now called “Classical” 
security complex theory, CSCT, and opened it up and applied the concept of 
security complexes on other sectors than the military and political. In CSCT 
securitization of issues was only seen in the light of amity and enmity which are 
actor generated and not a product of an intersubjective process (Buzan et al. 1998 
p 15f, 19). To create consistency about what a region is the politically defined 
state is used as the building-block for regions that can constellate a security 
complex (even though this is not necessarily according to the criteria set by the 
Copenhagen School). The state is also useful as a referent object as it has a strong 
“we” feeling about it. Rivalry with other collectives has proven useful to unite 
people within states and nations. This is one of the main reasons for the failures to 
securitize issues on the system level. These attempts have failed when they have 
met the dynamic of the rivalry of the middle-level collectives. In other words 
history has shown that it is primarily states and nations that are the most suitable 
for securitization processes (Buzan et al. 1998 p 36f).  
2.2.4 Sectors  
In Buzan et al. (1998) the Copenhagen school addresses five sectors for security 
to be implemented in. These are military, political, economy, societal, and 
environmental. They define a sector as ‘[a view] of the international system 
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through a lens that high-lights one particular aspect of the relationship and 
interaction among all of its constituent units’ (Buzan et al. 1998 p 27). In each 
sector it is likely to find different actors, and different types of threats that in 
different ways pose a threat to survival. The securitization process will therefore 
not look exactly the same in every sector. An example would be global warming 
in the environmental sector. Here the cause is global but the effects, like the sea 
level rising, will only have regional or perhaps local consequences. Migration that 
can be seen as a threat to identity in the societal sector can have local causes, like 
civil war, but have regional consequences. While the referent object in the case of 
global warming is likely to be a state or a number of states the referent object in 
the case of migration is more likely to be a nation. Some units will be common in 
all sectors. The state, because of its special nature, is an example of a reappearing 
actor (Buzan et al 1998 p 17).  
There is also a difference between ad hoc security and institutionalized 
security. If a sector has been institutionalized there is no need for drama during 
the securitization process. An example can be issues regarding defense. By 
implying that an issue is defense related the securitizing actor also implicitly says 
security, priority and in sense urgency to the referent object. The explanation has 
to be thorough and for politically reasons more dramatized if we are talking about 
ad hoc security (Buzan et al. 1998 p 28). 
When combining sectors and security complexes one question emerges. Are 
there different security complexes for each sector (homogeneous complexes) or 
are there links between the actions in different sectors that in turn creates one 
security complex for all sectors (heterogeneous complexes)? The Copenhagen 
School leaves this choice for the analyst to make. To get the big picture of how 
security concerns cross and impact other sectors the answer is to go with a 
heterogeneous complex. For obvious reasons that would be a rather big operation 
and not so practical if the analyst focuses on a specific sector or issue (Buzan et 
al. 1998 p 16f).  
The Copenhagen School devotes a passage to the different roles of the analyst 
and the actor. It is the analyst that decides through an analysis whether or not an 
issue has become securitized and become security. An issue is not security just 
because an actor says it is and in the same way an issue can become security even 
if it is not claimed to be security by an actor. What definitely will tell the analyst 
if an issue has become security is to see if policy has taken the form of “politics of 
existential threats” (Buzan et al. 1998 p 33). 
2.3 An Agenda for Health Security 
Health is a word that covers a wide spectrum of issues. All possible complaints 
that are taken care of at hospitals are naturally not of the character that they can be 
connected to international security relations. Sour throats and broken wrists are 
not relevant. Infectious diseases on the other hand are definitely relevant. These 
have plagued humans throughout the course of history and posed a greater threat 
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to mankind than wars and conflicts. What caused these diseases remained 
unknown until the 19th century when knowledge of bacteria began to emerge. 
Since then mankind has known that it is possible to protect itself from various 
kinds of diseases and modern healthcare was born. Healthcare is more or less 
available everywhere and under more or less control by politicians. The issue of 
health is definitely politicized and has been so for a long time. What we are faced 
against today are diseases that the normal routines of healthcare cannot manage. 
The spread of HIV and the increasing number of persons developing AIDS has 
placed HIV/AIDS and securitization in the spotlight.  
Price-Smith says that the reason for the newfound connection between 
infectious diseases and its implications on national security is because humans 
have a short generational memory. Up until the 19th century diseases like 
tuberculosis, smallpox and polio were very common all over the world. These 
diseases killed and disfigured millions. Then came the vaccines and antibiotics 
and for a while it looked like humans were winning the battle against the 
microbes. Hence, diseases and their terrible consequences that people had learned 
to live with and accept become forgotten (Price-Smith 2002 p 2f). Evans has a 
different approach as he says that it is the borderless and globalized world that has 
shifted focus towards the individual and universal human rights that has put health 
in the spotlight (Evans 2004 p 7-9). States are traditionally responsible for the 
health of its population. But as the expenses for healthcare and pharmaceuticals 
have risen and the economic interests of the pharmaceutical companies now 
prevail over the interests of populations the obligation of the state towards its 
population is not easily fulfilled. To receive economic aid from international 
institutions, like the World Bank, states have to wholeheartedly comply with an 
ideology of economic development and growth that supersedes the socioeconomic 
claims of human rights. There is in other words a conflict between the obligation 
of the state towards its population and the structures and practices of economic 
globalization (Evans 2004 p 19ff) The patents belonging to western 
pharmaceutical companies sort of embodies this conflict. Not only does 
intellectual property rights limit the availability of drugs to poor countries it also 
focuses research and development of the pharmaceutical companies on drugs with 
potential profit. Today Africa accounts for approximately 1.3 % of the global 
health market so it is financially better to develop drugs against baldness than 
against tropical diseases (Thomas 2004 p 67ff).  
2.3.1 Advantages of Securitization 
Budgets are always limited and the competition for funds is tough between 
different sectors. Issues that are securitized are obviously in a better position to 
receive adequate funding than nonsecuritized issues. An example is South Africa 
that in 2001 spent $4 billion on rearmament at a time when there is no present 
military threat to South Africa and at the same time saying that it lacks resources 
to expand its HIV/AIDS programmes (Heywood 2004 p 30). In the same spirit 
Prins emphasizes that securitizing an issue is the same as playing the trump card 
  10 
of priority but also that over the last two decades an “uneasy relationship between 
the claim that an issue is important and the claim that it is a ‘security issue’” has 
emerged (Prins 2004 p 939f). In many African states the ministries of health are 
usually the most under funded ministries with very little political clout. 
Securitizing lifts issues like HIV/AIDS from these ministries to higher levels in 
the government with substantially more clout. Pharmaceutical patents are also 
possible to override if the patents are seen as threats to national security. The 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) that bars countries from producing or importing cheaper made 
medicine has an article that allows for breaking the agreement if it is for 
protecting essential security interests. No dispute has yet occurred under this 
article 73 but voices are raised within the WTO and the UN to change that. India 
has lobbied in the Security Council for having AIDS declared as a threat to 
international peace and security, which is something that will be necessary for 
invoking article 73 (Elbe 2006 p 131ff). Securitization also has the benefit of 
giving attention to an issue. This can lead to increased international aid and most 
importantly alerting governments in concerned countries. Elbe quotes de Waal 
about African governments: “that [they] act when they perceive real threats to 
their power.” (Elbe 2006 p 134). Securitization can in other words provoke 
governments to respond. Highlighting the implications of HIV in the armed forces 
has proved to be a trigger for placing HIV/AIDS on the political agenda. When 
that is done it is much harder for politicians to deny the implications of HIV/AIDS 
on the rest of the society (Elbe 2006 p 135).  
2.3.2 Disadvantages of Securitizing Health 
It is the disadvantages that have caused parts of the academic world to react 
against the ongoing securitization process. Elbe reacts against absence of a 
normative debate of what will happen when an issue like HIV/AIDS becomes 
securitized and emphasizes that what the Copenhagen School thinks that all states 
are like the liberal-democratic states found in the west. Third world states, Elbe 
says, do not have the same distinction between state, society, and security. If 
implementing a rhetoric of existential threats the chances are high that the 
response would not be confined to the civil society but involve forceful military 
action against e.g. the ill or infected creating a situation where human rights are 
put a side to stop the spread of a disease. (Elbe 2006 p 131). Timing is essential to 
securitizing health as with securitizing environment. Securitization requires that a 
clear and present danger is presented to the referent object. This was done in the 
early 1990’s in attempts to securitize climate change. Back then the issue was 
about “water wars” that as we know did not happen. Skeptics, both politicians and 
scholars, then quickly took control over the issue and dismissed the entire thesis 
and climate change became a nonissue for most of the 1990’s. Both climate 
change and diseases like HIV/AIDS have things in common. They both progress 
slowly and their respective causes are in their own ways controversial (Prins 2004 
p 940). If seen as emergencies the actions against these threats are likely to be 
  11 
what is thought to be the best in the short term. This is not always what is best in 
the long term and it might even worsen the situation (Barnett & Prins 2006 p 361).  
2.3.3 Vulnerabilities 
Infectious diseases strike indiscriminately at all parts of society and affects all 
levels from the individual to the system-level. The effects of infectious diseases 
vary on different parts of society. They struck individuals, families, companies, 
and states economically and indiscriminately. They decrease the working 
capability, thus lowering production, profit and income while at the same time 
increasing the expenditure of the state. This affects poor people the most and 
widens the gab between the rich and the poor. This may lead to growing tensions 
within a state and can potentially lead to state-collapse (Price-Smith 2002 p 120).  
Price-Smith presents data for twenty randomly selected countries over a time 
period from 1951 to 1991 which shows significant correlation between state 
capacity and ERIDs (emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases). Countries 
with low state capacity are poor and even though there is no evidence that 
suggests that poor states are more likely to experience internal violence there are 
evidence that suggests a higher frequency of internal violence within states that 
experiences declining state capacity (Price-Smith 2002 p 50).   
Diseases tend to hamper world trade and in number of ways. Even though 
diseases do not only affect underdeveloped states these are harder hit due to 
lacking healthcare and weaker state functions. This may place affected states in a 
chronic underdevelopment which will exert a negative net drag on the world 
economy and impair prosperity. Diseases also affect travel and tourism and export 
and import of goods that may be infected (Price-Smith 2002 p 14). When things 
turn to the extreme and a significant part a countries population are infected and 
disabled the economy on both state and regional level are at a high risk of 
becoming destabilized (Price-Smith p 120). Some regions of the world are 
undoubtedly more affected than others. The most prosperous and developed 
countries are found in the temperate climate zone. Countries in the tropic climate 
zone are the most underdeveloped (except the oil producing states around the 
Arabic peninsula). It is in the tropical climate zones ERIDs are most common. 
The word ‘tropical disease’ is a hint about this (Price-Smith 2002 p 114). Impact 
of HIV/AIDS is visible in areas such as economic growth, poverty and 
agricultural production. Countries with a large portion of HIV infected have 
shown little but none rise in per capita income and GDP. The reason for this is 
that people with AIDS are less productive and that sick leave, supervisory time, 
disability, medical benefits, and death increases the expenditures for companies 
(Whiteside 2004 p 10-13). Increased poverty is not only an effect of HIV/AIDS it 
is also a cause of it. Girls and women are forced into prostitution to earn income 
and are therefore at high risk of both spreading and receiving HIV. Poverty also 
forces people to be mobile in search of work. Jobs in agriculture, mining, 
transportation, and trading forces people to leave their home vicinity for longer 
periods of time. This puts people in situations where it is more likely that they will 
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engage in casual sex. Studies show that migrants have a higher HIV prevalence 
independently of the prevalence rates at the site of departure or destination. AIDS 
is also significant as the mortality rate is unusually high, even for infectious 
diseases, and that it in particular strike the part of the population that is the most 
economically active in the society (Poku & Whiteside 2004 p. xxf). Barnett 
distinguishes HIV/AIDS which he calls a long-wave event from short-wave 
events, which we usually respond to in emergencies. He pinpoints the following 
characteristics of these long-wave events. We do usually not know when they 
started. When we are aware of the problem it takes a long time to stop it and 
sometimes they are unstoppable. It required long-term thinking to tackle the 
implications which differ from our way of tackling short-wave events. It is very 
hard to get people in power, i.e. politicians, to react constructively as long-wave 
events can cover decades which is far beyond the time-horizon of most 
politicians. We are not good at managing problem that requires novel responses 
(Barnett 2006 p 302f).  
2.3.4 Actors and Referent Objects 
The steps in the securitization move of HIV/AIDS are made visible by Prins. 
According to Prins the move started after the American ambassador to the UN, 
Richard Holbrook, had visited southern Africa in December of 1999. After having 
seen AIDS orphans in a day center he called the Secretary-General Annan and 
told him that they needed to have a meeting in the Security Council about AIDS. 
Annan responded by saying that AIDS was not a security issue and therefore not a 
matter for the council. However, when Vice-President Gore was preceding over 
the first Security-Council meeting of the new millennium Gore brought what, 
Prins sees as three basic points to the table regarding AIDS. “The heart of the 
security agenda is protecting lives; When a single disease threatens everything 
from economic strength to peacekeeping, we clearly face a security threat of the 
greatest magnitude; It is a security crisis because it threatens not just the 
individual citizen, but the very institutions that define and defend the character of 
society” (Prins 2004 p 941). The first point follows Secretary-General Annan’s 
line that the rights of men and women should have precedence over those of 
states. The second and third points were reiterated in Security Council Resolution 
1308. This the first and so far only resolution about AIDS addressed the dilemma 
of HIV-positive peacekeeping personnel and the possibility that they were in fact 
spreading HIV to the people they were sent to protect. Member states were 
therefore urged to test their military personnel working in blue helmets. 
Furthermore the council also recognized that the “HIV/AIDS pandemic is also 
exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability” and “that the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, if unchecked may pose a risk to stability and security” (Prins 2004 p 
942). This securitization move on the global level is yet to succeed. McInnes says 
that it is likely that the securitization move was mere an attempt to gain political 
attention for HIV/AIDS around the world (McInnes 2006 p 326) and to move the 
issue from the non-politicized sphere to the politicized sphere (Elbe 2006 p132). 
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To securitize an issue on the global level is fairly difficult. Attempts can on the 
other hand attract the attention of regions and states to the issue and these can 
later make a securitizing move with the state as the referent object. Health is 
mostly a national issue, even if disease tend t ignore state borders and have effects 
on a regional level. The roles of NGOs are not to be underestimated. NGOs 
working with HIV/AIDS related matters have bloomed in sub-Saharan Africa 
especially. This is mainly due to neglect and silence from many states to 
HIV/AIDS in this region (Webb 2004 p 20). The silence from governments has 
created a vacuum that is filled by NGOs that has taken the advocacy roll and 
provided shelter and medicine for the ill. Even though their claim of legitimacy as 
representatives for the people have been contested by many ‘silence’ governments 
their voice in the debate is heard (Webb 2004 p 24, 31). 
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3 South Africa 
3.1 HIV in South Africa 
The first cases of HIV were discovered in South Africa in 1980’s. The group 
worst affected were as in the rest of the world at the time white gay men but also 
migrant miners from Malawi (Marks 2002 p 17). In the mid-1980’s the disease 
started to affected a broader part of the society. Despite this no actions were taken 
from the apartheid government and instead the initiative to create a national health 
plan came from ANC and health and welfare NGOs. In 1994, right in the middle 
of the transition, HIV/AIDS erupted. In 1992 the very unusual alliance of ANC 
and the Department of Health held a joint conference on AIDS and the National 
AIDS Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) was formed. NACOSA developed 
an AIDS plan that proposed a holistic and multisectoral response. It would include 
education, prevention, counseling, healthcare, welfare, and research. The 
responsibility to lead, fund and implement the plan would fall on a new national 
coordinating structure in the presidential office (Johnson 2004 p 113f). The HIV 
prevalence rates began to skyrocket in 1994 and an estimated 10% of the 
population was infected. In 1998-99 the prevalence rate reached slightly above 
20% and has remained there since. AIDS kills slowly and the number of deaths is 
increasing rapidly. From 1997 – 2004 the official mortality rate increased by 79%. 
Today 5.5 million South African are HIV positive and it estimated that 2 million 
of them are unaware their condition. 240 000 of them are children under the age 
of 15 (UNAIDS 2006 p 11). 
   
3.2 The New South Africa 
After democratization ANC that had worked in exile against the apartheid regime 
was merged with internal democratic movements. The democratic forces working 
inside South Africa had a tradition of open, decentralized organizations, and 
responsive style of leadership. This was in sharp contrast to the ANC. As a 
militant organization the ANC had a secretive, authoritarian and hierarchal 
leadership style. This was later passed on to the government when the ANC won 
the first free elections in 1994. The transition to a democratic society that 
immediately began after the installment of the new government created a virtual 
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brain-drain of NGOs as many persons received new employment inside the new 
government. Financial resources from international donors that previously had 
gone to the NGOs now went directly to the state. NGOs and other popular 
organizations in the civil society lost both capacity and influence. The ANC elite 
that was used to top-down decision-making, a centralized organization and most 
important tight internal discipline looked upon civil society organizations with 
large skepticism and if they criticized the government the organizations were 
simply neglected (Johnson 2004 p 120f). This made the situation for NGOs in 
South Africa harsher as they were lacking funds and were opposed by the 
government (Butler 2005 p 601). Many in the government saw it as their 
exclusive role to provide knowledge, develop policy, and to set the agenda in the 
new South Africa (Johnson 2004 p 121). One thing that united the National Party 
of the apartheid era and the ANC was their conservatism. Xenophobia, 
homosexuality, sexually transmitted diseases, and male power were issues that 
were not discussed by either the pre- or post-1994 governments. The national 
AIDS plan contained very predictable projections on how HIV/AIDS would 
spread during the 1990’s. However as with many plans of that time in South 
Africa the economic and human resources available to implement the new 
strategies were overestimated (Butler 2005 p 593). Conflicts between old 
apartheid-era and new civil servants and the enormous bureaucratic restructuring 
and transition to form democratic institutions created a very slow working 
government. Health was also an issue for the provincial authorities and therefore 
not under direct national control. When directives finally left the Department of 
Health a new level of bureaucracy waited with the same kind of problems. Even if 
the NACOSA plan was ambitious the plan failed in the implementation phase. A 
national review of the AIDS plan in 1997 concluded that the commitment was 
very weak outside the Department of Health and that it was too narrowly focused 
on the health sector (Johnson 2004 p 113). The provincial departments of health 
were very ill-suited for inter-sectoral challenges (Butler 2005 p 600). 
1996 saw the eruption of the Sarafina II scandal. Sarafina II was a educational 
musical aimed at the South African youth. It was funded by the Department of 
Health with funds received from the European Union to battle HIV/AIDS. The 
story behind the scandal was that the Department of Health did not consult other 
actors on the national and provincial level before granting the big budget of R14 
million. The scandal was also fueled by the media with accusations of corruption 
in the development of the play. The next scandal did not wait to long. The 
Virodene drug was a domestically developed drug that was endorsed by the 
government after the 1997 AIDS review. However, the limited testing of the drug 
raised questions within the Medicines’ Control Council and Medical Research 
Council. Both councils wanted further testing of the drug before approval. NGOs 
supported the medical opinion and when the politicians did not change their 
opinion a new war of allegations between the government and NGOs erupted. In 
the end the Virodene drug turned out to be nothing more than an industrial solvent 
and media once again launched attacks on the Department of Health. The 
department responded with defensiveness and hostility against the accusers and 
the affair harmed the entire South African AIDS programme (Johnson 2004 p 
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122). The Sarafina II and the Virodene scandal created a political context that 
completely came to overshadow the HIV/AIDS programme (Parkhurst & Lush 
2004 p 1917). 
Butler says that there were two competing response models on how to best 
effectively tackle HIV/AIDS. The medical establishment supported by many 
NGOs called for a clear national political leadership and mobilization to publicly 
fund contraceptives, to introduce extensive use of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission and to drastically scale-up the public ARV 
programmes. The other response policy is the one most endorsed by the 
government, especially after 2000. This policy consists of two parts. The first 
involving preventive care in form prioritized anti-poverty programmes and social 
grants in especially rural communities. The other part is palliative care with 
nutrition and traditional medicine. Notable is that western medicine and ARVs are 
almost entirely absent (Butler 2005 p 596). This is mainly attributed to African 
nationalism. As the leader of the African continent South Africa is setting an 
example by moving away from Western dependency and dictations on what to do 
(Parkhurst & Lush 2004 p 1916f). In 2000 president Mbeki launched what Butler 
calls “broadsides” against the entire intellectual community when he questioned 
the causal link between HIV and AIDS and claiming (with “own” experience) that 
ARVs could be toxic. Instead of medical solutions he opted for further research in 
what way socio-economic causes could lead to AIDS. A new composition of the 
National AIDS Committee was presented with no leading medical expert in it. A 
new strategic HIV/AIDS/STD plan was launched by the government without any 
reference to ARVs. Under enormous pressure from both internationally and 
domestically the government caved and in 2002 a task team was set up to look 
into “various treatment options including anti-retroviral treatment.” (Butler 2005 p 
594f).  
3.3 Public Awareness 
Denial of AIDS is widespread in the South Africa and biomedical denialism is a 
popular label given too many groupings in the South African community. First of 
all it is given to people questioning the link between HIV and AIDS. Then there 
are those seeing poverty as the primary cause of AIDS and those who think that 
AIDS is actually caused by ARVs and finally those accusing medical science and 
scientists for being part of a capitalist and racist conspiracy. “Othering” or 
claiming that AIDS is a problem of others and not something that exists here is 
common. South Africans and other Africans as well therefore see AIDS as 
something that comes from Western homosexuals and from them spread to 
Africans, from whites to blacks and from the rich to the poor. The still living 
legacy of the public healthcare system of the apartheid era that used science as an 
instrument for enforcement of apartheid is not forgotten by the black community. 
Research was conducted on how to control the black reproduction while trying to 
increase the white. Chemical and biological weapons were also used to assassinate 
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black leaders. Evidence also suggests that scientific research on possible ways to 
induce sterility on the black population was conducted and also that HIV positive 
prostitutes were used to deliberately spread the virus among the blacks. Mbeki 
therefore once famously called theories about African or Haitian origins of AIDS 
as “insulting” (Butler 2005 p 604). African nationalism (Parkhurst & Lush 2004 p 
1916f) has resulted in the seeking of African solutions instead of listening to the 
scientific opinion of the West. In 2002 papers circulating at the ANC headquarter 
were saying that the thesis of HIV/AIDS is nothing more than centuries-old white 
racism and that all it does is to further project these ideas on Africans and black 
people (Butler 2005 p 605f). This has also been publicly admitted by Mbeki as he 
gave a speech, which Prins paraphrases. “To accept that aetiology of the African 
pandemic was – as we now are sure that it was – overwhelmingly via hetero-
sexual intercourse in the presence of STD co-factors, with some role for 
iatrogenic transmission via dirty needles, seemed to concede the apartheid stereo-
type of unclean Africans, ‘human of the lower order, unable to subject passion to 
reason … natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs … doomed to an inevitable 
mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust’.” (Prins 2004 
p 935). 
It is also important to bear in mind that the common thing to do in South 
Africa if you seek medical advice is to visit Western doctors and consult 
traditional medicine. Polls show that as many as 80 % of the South Africans 
consult traditional healers for one reason or another despite that Western medicine 
is available (Walker et al. 2004 p 93f). The stigma most associated with AIDS is 
witchcraft. Young people suddenly dying for no apparent reason are fuel for these 
kinds of beliefs. Breaking sexual taboos and breaking up with traditions and living 
a Western lifestyle can also make you receptive to witchcraft. Witchcraft is feared 
and it is therefore very unlikely, if not impossible, for a person with HIV/AIDS to 
be open about it (Walker & Reid & Cornell 2004 p 100f). It is common that 
people diagnosed with HIV do not even tell their partner about it. Many carry the 
opinion that HIV positives should be thrown out from the community. This 
pushed people into doing terrible things for a cure. Thriving myths like having sex 
with a virgin is thought to be the reason for the dramatic rise in child rape (Walker 
et al 2004 p 102) and violence against schoolgirls (Marks 2002 p 21). Even if 
things are progressing forward on how to prevent transmission of HIV there is 
still a high degree of stigmatization associated with HIV/AIDS in the 
communities and behavioral changes are still to be seen (Parkhurst & Lush 2004 p 
1921).      
3.4 The Regional Context 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an intergovernmental 
organization that works as one of the pillars of the African Union. SADC consists 
of 14 southern African states stretching from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Tanzania in the north to South Africa in the south. The first summit 
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communiqués that addresses AIDS are from the summits in 1997 and 1998. 
HIV/AIDS is not a separate issue but seen as a challenge when it comes to 
fulfilling the aspirations and hopes of the youth (Summit Communiqués 2004 p 
81, 94). The following years the issue of HIV/AIDS grew bigger and the summit 
in Lesotho in 2003 was solely dedicated to HIV/AIDS. The Executive Secretary 
of the SADC, Dr. Ramsamy, said that the frighteningly increasing HIV prevalence 
rates had “resulted in millions of orphans and declines in life expectancy” and that 
“the battle against HIV/AIDS was getting more difficult and complex [but] that 
the battle has to be won however difficult it is.” (Summit Communiqués 2004 p 
157). The summit also concluded that the best practices for implementation in 
their HIV/AIDS programmes would include prevented mother-to-child 
transmissions by using ARV therapy and that the SADC members should jointly 
buy bulk ARVs to reduce the costs (Summit Communiques 2004 p 158). 
Throughout the summit communiqué it is the problems HIV/AIDS poses on the 
socio-economic development that attracts most attention. It is also noted that 
HIV/AIDS seriously undermine the attempts of achieving the UN’s Millenium 
Development Goals on reducing global poverty by half by 2015 (Summit 
Communique p 156-159). 
In the SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ of Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation signed in 2004 by the SADC members HIV/AIDS is 
mentioned several times. The foreword begins with “Peace, security and political 
stability are the linchpins for socio-economic development” and that the protocol 
is “to serve as an instrument for dealing with the Southern African region’s 
political, defence and security challenges.” (SADC 2004 p 5). And that the 
objective is to “create a peaceful and stable political and security environment”. 
HIV and AIDS is first mentioned in between demining and “combating of illicit 
trafficking in small arms and light weapons” in a list of activities requiring 
cooperation (SADC 2004 p 6). The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) 
deals with four different sectors. The political, defence, state security and public 
security sectors. The document lists challenges for the sectors and how to tackle 
eight preset objectives within the respective sector. All sectors have HIV and 
AIDS in their lists of challenges. All challenges are numbered (i, ii, iii…) but if 
the numbering has a real purpose is unclear the same goes for the strategies. 
Objective 1 (“To protect the people and safeguard the development of Region 
against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state and 
inter-state conflicts and aggression.”(SADC 2004 p 17)) is the only objective that 
has measures against HIV and AIDS in the strategies. The political sector lists 
“Device measures to Combat the HIV and AIDS pandemic” last of five strategies 
(SADC 2004 p 18). The state security sector has “Prevent the spread of the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic through public awareness and advocacy campaigns” and 
“Undertake HIV and AIDS education against stigmatisation and discrimination” 
listed as strategies number ix and xi of xii (SADC 2004 p 32f). The public 
security sector has “Devise effective measures to address the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic in the law enforcement agencies” (SADC 2004 p 38). 
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4 Conclusion 
4.1 The Complexity of HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
What I have come to understand is that South Africa with all of its history, 
different peoples and, traditions create a very complex society. Just as South 
Africa struggles with the West and struggles on the African continent to show that 
it is the leading nation it also struggles within. It is only been a little more than 10 
years since democratization and memories of apartheid are still very much alive. 
As South African politics and policy on HIV/AIDS have experienced scandal 
after scandal it has been unsuccessful in reaching out to people. The focus of the 
political efforts to fight HIV/AIDS has been preventive and education and 
information campaigns have made people somewhat aware of how HIV spreads. 
The reluctance to discuss the problems facing those infected and suspiciousness 
about Western medicine underpinned the public opinion that AIDS was caused by 
witchcraft. Memories of the white mans oppression of the past and the 
experiences of the attempts of the white man’s Western world to enforce white 
man solutions and way of thinking on African people have resulted in African 
nationalism and the promotion of African solutions 
The way ordinary people in South Africa behave against those infected with 
HIV and with fully developed AIDS tell an interesting story. A securitizing actor 
seems to be found not in the profane but in the sacred world. The role of 
traditional medicine and religion cannot be disregarded. For a large part of the 
people of South Africa HIV positive persons are seen as dangerous and cursed. 
That traditional belief could inadvertently impose such sentiments that forces 
people to silence and neglect of their disease of fear of becoming expelled from 
society and from their own families was nothing I expected to find. Instead of the 
virus it is the people that are seen as the threat. Extraordinary measures allowing 
for breaking the normal rules of law have been imposed. How traditional religion 
is a part of the process is something that neither I nor the Copenhagen School can 
provide explanations for. Once again are we faced with the fact that applying 
theories, no matter how open and wide they tend to be, that are created by people 
of from America and Europe will always take for granted that they know how the 
world works. The depths and dynamics of HIV/AIDS in South Africa cannot be 
fully explained by such theories as they are limited to a Western way of thinking.   
If we look on how the government is acting in the process we see that they 
quite early on saw HIV/AIDS as a problem and the issue became part of the 
political agenda. Both the government and NGOs worked as securitizing actors in 
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the early 1990’s. The government saw HIV/AIDS as an existential threat as it 
threatened social and economic development and HIV/AIDS became closely 
connected to poverty. The referent object, the South African state represented by 
its people, accepted this view and what now remained to complete the 
securitization were extraordinary measures or the laying of a foundation that 
makes it possible to use such measures. It is here that complexity takes over. The 
actions of the government were clouded by scandals and media outrage. 
HIV/AIDS was a threat but without a clear and firm response. The people were 
left to deal with the threat on their own and traditional beliefs provided answers 
that politicians did not have. The securitization moves on the international arena 
have increased the pressure on South Africa and other African states to increase 
the usage of ARVs to help people infected with HIV. This group have, strangely 
enough, been absent from the political HIV/AIDS discourse in South Africa. 
4.2 Future Research 
I mentioned in the introduction that I am with this thesis taking the first steps in 
un-chartered territory. This “territory” is truly  multi- and definitely  inter-
disciplinary. The number of different  approaches seems to be unlimited.   
We have not seen the end or the full potential of HIV/AIDS. Regardless of the 
stable and somewhat decreasing prevalence rates in some states it is not until now 
that those infected during the middle-late 1990’s are passing away. It is not until 
now and the years to come that we can start to make out the effects of this disease 
on communities, states, regions and perhaps continents. South Africa and many 
other African states are facing problems of enormous proportions that we actually 
know too little of.   
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